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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
J. L. GIBSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
UTAH STATE TEACHERS' RETIRE-

MENT BOARD, L E R 0 Y E.
COWLES, CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, JOSEPH CHEZ, ALEX
JEX, MILTON B. TAYLOR, D.
A. WOOTTON, and J. R.
SMITH, members thereof,

Case No.
6220

Defendants.

BRIEF of PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff at all times herein mentioned has
been and now is a teacher employed by the public schools
of the State of Utah.
On or about the first day of November, 1923. the
plaintiff became a holder of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America and the University of Utah contributed one half of each monthly premium up to and including the payment made during December of 193'7.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Since said payment made in December of 1937 neither
the plaintiff nor the University of Utah nor any subdivision of the State of Utah has contributed any part
of any premium on this contract.

In 1937 the state legislature of the State of Utah
passed an act known as the Teachers' Retirement Act
(Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937) setting. up a Utah
State Teachers' Retirement System providing for the
retirement of the teachers employed by the· public schools
of the State of Utah. Pursuant to said law plaintiff
made application for membership in said system and
a hearing was held by the Teachers' Retirement Board
on said application. That as a result of said hearing the
Teachers' Retirement Board denied his application for
membership.

The plaintiff thereafter brought an action for declaratory judgment in the District Court of Salt Lake
County requesting said Court to declare and determine
his status in regard to said system. The District Court
dismissed said petition on the grounds that it had no
jurisdiction in such a hearing of said matter.

The plaintiff has tendered and still tenders to the
Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board in full any and
all sums necessary to pay his contributions in said system
if he is a member.
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THE LAW
Section 11.

Membership.

With the exception of those teachers who are
excluded from membership by the provisions of
section 12 hereof, all teachers become members of
the retirement system as follows:
(a) Every teacher who is employed in the
public schools of this state on July 1, 1937, shall
become a member of the retirement system on
that date.
(b) Every teacher who shall become employed in the public schools of this state after
July 1, 1937, shall become a member of the retirement system on the effective date of such
employment.
Section 12.

Teachers Excluded From Membership.

The following teachers shall be excluded
from membership in the retirement system:
(a) Every teacher employed on a parttime or substitute basis who was not already a
member when he entered the part-time or substitute status.
(h) Every teacher who is the holder of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of America or
with any other private organization or company,
in which the State of Utah, or any subdivision
thereof contributes part of the premium, under
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said contract; provided, however, that every such
teacher, upon ceasing to be a holder of such
contract and being otherwise eligible to membership in this system, shall forthwith become a member of the system.
(c) Every teacher serving as an exchange
from outside the state.
(d) Every teacher who is a contributing
member. of a local system, subject to the provisions of section 13 hereof.

ARGUMENT
This is an action brought by the plaintiff against
the defendants to force them to accept the plaintiff as
a member of said system and to do for him the acts required of them by laws as provided in the Teachers'
Retirement Act, Laws of Utah, 1937, Chapter 85.
The facts involved in this case are without dispute
and the only question involved is a question of law,
whether or not under the facts herein the plaintiff is
entitled to be a member of the Utah State Teachers'
Retirement .System. The Teachers' Retirement Board
claims that it is the sole judge and its decisions are conclusive as to whether or not any person is a member
or is eligible for membership in said system and that by
virture of its alleged hearing in this matter in which it
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declared the plaintiff not eligible for membership he is
conclusively bound by such hearing and decision. We
claim that the legislature defined and settled who were
members of the retirement system and that the defendants have no right to say who is or who is not a member.
There are no questions of fad that are involved,
but only questions of law. At the time of the alleged
hearing before the defendants the only question involved was one of law which could not be passed by the
defendants.
Paragraph 4 of the defendants' claimed findings
of fact is as follows:
"That Mr. Gibson ceased making premium
payments to the Teacher's Insurance and Annuity
Association of America on said policy on or about
the 29th day of December, 1937, and caused the
University of Utah to ceased contributing its part
of the premiums to said Association on or about
the 29th day of December, 1937, but retained said
contract so as to claim and receive the deferred
annuity provided therein on the basis of the contributions made to December 29, 1937."
This paragraph shows that there was not any question of fact to be determined. The portion of the said
paragraph which states "but retained said contract so
as to claim and receive the deferred annuity provided
therein on the basis of the contributions made to December 29, 1937'" is not only contrary to the evidence before
the Board, but is a figment of the imagination and a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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conclusion of law. Both sides are in agreement as to tht
facts, but were in dispute as to the law. That is still
the case.
The Teachers' Retirement Act in section 8 gives the
board "the power and authority to hear and determine
all facts pertaining to applications for benefits under
the retirement system - - - ." It does not say that after
determining the facts it has the authority to determine
eligibility which would be a question of law, so as
to make it a final adjudication. Sections 4 and 8 both
authorize the board to hold a hearing to determine facts
when an application has been made for benefits, but do
not give it authority to determine who are members.
The legislature has done that for the board in sections
11 and 12 of the act and the board acts in excess of its
authority if it presumes the right to exclude any one
who is eligible under the provisions of said sections.
There is no prov1s1on of the act which authorizes
a hearing to determine membership.
The applicant was not making an application for
benefits when he applied for membership. He is not yet
eligible for benefits, not having retired. In making an
application he was attempting to bring the matter to
issue and convince the defendants that he was eligible
and that it should comply with the provisions of sections
1?, 18 and 19 of the act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
The hoard under the terms of section 8 has the
authority to determine "matters pertaining to the administration" of the act and consequently could probably require an application for membership for administrative
purposes. But under such administrative authority it
could not hold a judicial hearing and adjudicate the
plaintiff out of rights granted to him by law.

We claim that there is no question involved as to
whether or not the board is a quasi judicial body because
no matter what it is it has no more authority than
granted to it by the act and that which is necessarily
inferred therefrom, and the act does not provide for
such an alleged hearing. See U. of U. v. Ind. Com. of
Utah. 64 U. 2?3, 229 P. 1103.
The defendants have assumed the right in their
alleged findings of fact and conclusions of law to construe
a contract of insurance and state:
"4. That Mr. Gibson ceased making premium payments to the Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association of America on said policy
on or about the 29th day of December, 1937, and
caused the University of Utah to cease contributing its part of the premiums to said Association
on or about the 29th day of December, 1937, hut
retained said contract so as to claim and receive
the deferred annuity provided therein on the
basis of the contributions made to December 29,
1937."
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"Conclusions
"From the foregoing Findings of Fact the
Board concludes that Mr. Gibson's said contract
with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America was not cancelled or wiped out
by the stopping of premium payments on the
date so mentioned in Finding No. 3; that notwithstanding the stopping of premium payments
on the said dates, Mr. Gibson was and is entitled
to the future benefits provided for in said contract; that said contract is not subject to immediate cancellation and does not cease to vield
benefits to Mr. Gibson under its terms by r~ason
of failure to pay premiums: that the benefits
provided for in said contract are subject to reestablishment to their full extent in the manner
specified in said contract; that the said James L.
Gibson was, at the time his application for membership in the Utah Teachers' Retirement System
was filed, and is now, a holder of a retirement
annuity contract with the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America; and that
the said James L. Gibson, as a holder of a contract with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America, is excluded from membership in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement
System under the provisions of Section 12 of the
Teachers' Retirement Act, Chapter 85, Session
Laws of Utah, 1937."
We have a Utah Supreme Court case which shows
that said alleged findings of fact and conclusions are
right in the teeth of the settled law of this state and the
acts of the defendants are in excess of their authority.
It is:
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Continental Casualty Co. v. Ind. Com. of Utah,
61 U. 16, 210 P. 12?:
"The Industrial Commission, being an administrative body, is, tcithout authority to construe
and apply a contract of insurance to cover workmen in the employ of one not named as the insured, and therefore an award against insurer for
death of au employee of the independent contractor operating mine under contract with the
insured is unauthorized, though the policy described the mine at the place of employment."

Section 11 of the statute says "With the exception
of those teachers who are excluded from membership
by the provisions of section 12 hereof, all teachers shall
become members of the retirement system - - - ."

Section 12 states:
"The following teachers shall be excluded
from membership 1n the retirement system:

"(a)
"(b) Every teacher who is the holder of a
retirement annuity contract with the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America or
with any other private organization or company,
in which the State of Utah, or any subdivision
thereof contributes parts of the premium, under
said contract; provided, however, that every such
teacher, upon ceasing to be the holder of such
contract and being otherwise eligible to membership in this system, shall forthwith become a
member of the system.
"(c) - - - "(d) - - - Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In· subsection (b) . the clause· "in which the State
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof contributes part of
the premium, under said contract" modifies both the
preceding clauses so that the subsection means: "The
following teachers shall be excluded from membership
in the retirement system: (b) Every teacher who is the
holder of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America in which
the State of Utah contributes part of the premium under
said contract, provided, however, - - - ,"
59 C. ]. 980 says:

"Where several words are connected hv a
copulative conjunction they are presumed t~ be
of the same class." Likewise in Carbon v. Shelton,
107 S. W. 793, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509, and also
all the cases in the note in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509.
The word "contributes" used is in the present tense
and not in the past. The words "is the holder" are also
in the present tense.
The fact is admitted that neither the plaintiff nor
the State of Utah, nor any subdivision thereof, has contributed any part of any premium since the latter part
of December, 1937. The law provides that under such
circumstances the teacher "Shall forthwith become a
member of the system." The plaintiff maintains that
under this section he is a member of the retirement system.
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Defendants contend ·that the plaintiff is still the
holder of a retiren1ent annuity contract with the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America and is,
therefore, not eligible for membership in the Teachers'
Retirement System. The Court will note in going over
the contract introduced in evidence with the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America that it
is a form contract used by the association. The defendants
claim that the said contract "is not subject to assignment
or cancellations," and therefore, the plaintiff cannot
dispossess himself of rights accrued prior to December,
193'7 under the terms of said contract. Certainly the legislature in passing subsection (b) of section twelve had
in mind the terms of said form contracts and contemplated that persons might do, and were entitled to do,
just as the plaintiff has done here, so as to become
a member of the state system. If such were not the case
and not the law the statement "that every such teacher,
upon ceasing to be a holder of such contract and being
otherwise eligible to membership in this system, shall
forthwith become a member of the system," could have
no meaning whatsoever. The plaintiff has done everything that the defendants claim that it is possible for
him to do or for anyone else to do to dispossess himself
of the contract with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America and is certainly a member of the
Teachers' Retirement System if the provisions in subsection (b), Section 12 means anything.
Under the defendants' contention in this case no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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person who had a contract with the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America could possibly
"cease to be a holder of such contract" under the terms
of said subsection, and, therefore, it would mean nothing.
The defendants apparently claim that the plaintiff
would get something to which he is not entitled if he
should be determined a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. We submit to the Court that the
Teachers' Retirement System and the wording thereof
take care of this in that the amount to which plaintiff
would be entitled is determined by the years of prior
service and the years of prior service are determined
not by the number of years which he has been a teacher
but by the number of years which he has been a teacher
and not a holder of a retirement annuity contract with
the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of
America in which the State of Utah contributes part of
said premiums. We submit to the Court that if the plaintiff is not a member of the state system he would not
receive nearly as much money in the form of a pension
after his approximately 36 years of long and faithful
service as would another man belonging to the said
system who had spent a like time which would constitute an unfair discrimination within a class making
the provisions of the statute unconstitutional.
59

c. ]. 9'?0:
"The court will, if possible, place upon the
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statute a construction which ·will not result in
injustice, oppression, hardship or inconvenience."
Certainly the plaintiff is at least entitled to benefits
for the thirty-six years' service, less the period from 1921
to 1937, both inclusive, when the state paid into the
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America,
so as to bring his pension up to what other persons of like
service would receive.
The legislature must have had within its contemplation, at the time of passing said subsection, a situation like the one now before the court and passed said
provisions so that if a man with a Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America contract would not
receive as much as he would under the terms of a state
contract he could "cease to be a holder of said contract
- - - - and forthwith become a member of the system"
by doing the only thing that the defendants claim IS
possible for him to do. This the plaintiff has done.
He has complied with the statute in every particular
and particularly said subsection (h), and therefore, as
a matter of law, he is a member of the State Teachers'
Retirement System, and is entitled to have this Court
declare him to be such a member and to require the
defendants to acknowledge him as such.
Teachers' Retirement Acts should be construed libera1ly toward applicants. (Wards v. Teachers' Retirement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Board, 241 N. Y. S. 535; In re Sanborn, 159 Wash. 112,
292 P. 259.)
The plaintiff contends that the plain, clear and
unambiguous meaning of the Teachers' Retirement Act is
as he claims, and more especially so under a liberal
construction, and that any other meaning would be
strained and artificial. "Where the language of a statute
it plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, even though other meanings could be found
and the court cannot indulge in speculation as to the
probable or possible qualification which might have been
in the mind of the legislature, but that statute must be
given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning,
and cannot be extended beyond it because of some supposed policy of the law, or because the legislature did
not use proper words to express its meaning, or the court
would be assuming legislative authority." 59 C.]. 9?0.
If the court were to find that it be possible that the
defendants construction is correct ,then the plaintiff
contends that such a construction is unconstitutional and
that for that reason the plaintiff's theory should prevail.
"Where validity of a statute is assailed and there are
two possible interpretations, one by which the statute
would be unconstitutional and by the other it would be
valid, the court should adopt the construction which
would uphold it." 11 Am. ]ur. Constitutional Law, Section
9'?. Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 U
491, 15 p (2d) 633.
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"The duty of the courts so to construe a
statute as to save its constitutionality when it is
reasonably susceptible to two constructions includes the duty of adopting a construction that
will not subject it to a succession of doubts as to
its constitutionality, for it is well settled that a
statute must be construed if fairly possible, so
as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that
score." 11 Am. }ur. Constitutional Law, Sec. 9'?.

If this statute is subject to the interpretation claimed
by the defendants, the plaintiff alleges that it is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. This clause does not prevent the states
from distinguishing, selecting, and classifying objects of
legislation within a wide range of discretion; but a classification must be based upon some reasonable ground,
some difference which bears a just and proper relation
to the classification and not a mere arbitrary selection.
(Field v. Barber, etc., Co., 194 U. S. 618.) The classification must be reasonable in relation to the purposes sought
to be accomplished by the statute.
In this case the general class to which the act applies
ts teachers. Any attempt to subdivide such a natural
class and to enact different rules for each subdivision is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
"The legislature cannot take what might be
· termed a: natural class of persons, split that class
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in two and then arbitrarily designate the disservered sections of the original unit as two classes
and thereupon enact different rules for the government of each." 12 Am. fur. Constitutional Law,
Sec. 482.
In the act now before the Court "there are two
types of teachers who had annuity contracts, part of
the premium of which was paid by public funds. These
two groups are those having annuity contracts with the
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of Ameria
and those who are members of "Local Systems."
The statute specifically provides in Section 1J how
members of local systems may become members of the
Teachers' Retirement System. There is no reasonable
basis for distinction between members of this system
and teachers holding contracts with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, except that
the latter have contracts with a private organization
and the former with a public organization, and such a
distinction could not be termed reasonable. Any attempts
to differentiate between and give different rights to
these two groups of teachers can have no reasonable
foundation and are clearly arbitrary.
Teachers in the University of Utah are eligible for
contracts with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America and many of them attempted to pro·
vide for their old age by buying and contributing to
contracts in said organization, others less diligent ignored
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their opportunities and made no attempts to save money
and to protect themselves.
Those who have been diligent, saved and attempted
to be self-supporting and not to become a burden on the
state, could not, if the defendants' interpretation is correct, ever, or in any manner, become members of the
Teachers' Retirement System. Under their contracts
many would get only a small annuity for the remainder of their lives, and the State would be penalizing those
who in their past lives have been careful, thrifty and
foresighted, and would reward those who have been
careless and shortsighted by paying to them a monthly
sum considerably in excess of that which those who
were careful and thrifty, can ever hope to obtain.
Hence it is seen that any attempts to find a reasonable basis for the said classification must fail, and that
the act if it is interpreted in the manner defendants
desire must be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has held in the case of Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
61 U. 16, 210 P. 12?, supra, that the Industrial Commission being an administrative body could not construe a contract of insurance and it would, therefore,
necessarily follow in this case that the Teachers' Retirement Board could certainly not construe the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association of America contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

and draw conclusions of law from it. It is less a judicial
body than is the Industrial Commission which exercised
many quasi judicial functions.
The Teachers' Retirement Act does not provide for
any method of appeal or time in which an appeal could
be made or taken. The lack of such provisions lends
much weight to the claim of plaintiff that the Teachers'
Retirement Board has no authority to determine any
questions except those of fact and then only in cases
in which applications for benefits have been made.
Defendants rely to a great extent on the fact that
plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment in the District Court of Salt Lake County was dismissed by the
judge. Defendants seem to forget that said case was dismissed at their request on the grounds that the District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine such
a matter. The said hearing can have no bearing upon
this matter whatsoever, except to show due diligence
on the part of the plaintiff. Defendants' findings of
fact and conclusions of law rendered as a result of the
hearing before them were not rendered or given or served
on the plaintiff until immediately prior to the hearing
in the District Court and at such time said decision,
findings of fact and conclusions of law were apparently
rendered for the sole and only purpose of enabling and
assisting them to fight said case and to have some
grounds to contest said case in the District Court. This
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was more than a year after said decision was rendered
by the Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board.
Defendants claim that plaintiff has no right to
have this court determine his status as a member of
said system because of laches in applying for said writs
after the said hearing before the Teachers' Retirement
Board. We submit, however, under the law that the
plaintiff was a member of said system and as such is
not required to do or cause the courts to do anything in
regard to said system until he is applying for benefits
which he has not yet done. We further submit that if the
question of laches were well taken the plaintiff is not
guilty of such due to the fact that he immediately went
to the District Court of the State of Utah and attempted
to get a determination of this matter and that said
District Court declared itself without jurisdiction to
hear the same. Furthermore, the question of laches arises
only in equitable proceedings and this is a writ at law
and thus laches are inapplicable and have no bearing
on the matter.
The plaintiff is clearly entitled to the relief prayed
for in his application for writ of mandate.
Respectfully submitted,

J.

LAMBERT GIBSON,

MARL D. GIBSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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